Military Railroads in the Austro-Prussian War

The Austro-Prussian War - years 1866

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The Austro-Prussian War, Seven Weeks' War, German Civil War, Brothers War or Fraternal War, known in Germany as Deutscher Krieg ("German War"), Deutscher Bruderkrie(“German war of brothers") and by a variety of other names, was fought in 1866 between the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia, with each also being aided by various allies within the German Confederation. Prussia had also allied with the Kingdom of Italy, linking this conflict to the Third Independence War of Italian unification. The Austro-Prussian War was part of the wider rivalry between Austria and Prussia, and resulted in Prussian dominance over the German states.

The major result of the war was a shift in power among the German states away from Austrian and towards Prussian hegemony. It resulted in the abolition of the German Confederation and its partial replacement by the unification of all of the northern German states in the North German Confederation that excluded Austria and the other Southern German states, a Kleindeutsches Reich. The war also resulted in the Italian annexation of the Austrian province of Venetia.

Railroads – Speed of Concentration

Austro-Prussian War used railways to concentrate troops during mobilization. The impact of the speed of railway communications on warfare was also demonstrated rather impressively.

The railway system of Prussia was more extensively developed than that within Austria. Railways made it possible to supply larger numbers of troops than hitherto and allowed the rapid movement of troops within friendly territory. The more efficient Prussian rail network allowed the Prussian army to concentrate more rapidly than the Austrians. Moltke, reviewing his plans to Roon stated, "We have the inestimable advantage of being able to carry our Field Army of 285,000 men over five railway lines and of virtually concentrating them in twenty-five days. ... Austria has only one railway line and it will take her forty-five days to assemble 200,000 men." Moltke had also said earlier, "Nothing could be more welcome to us than to have now the war that we must have."

The Austrian army under Ludwig von Benedek in Bohemia (the present-day Czech Republic) might previously have been expected to enjoy the advantage of the "central position", by being able to concentrate on successive attacking armies strung out along the frontier, but the quicker Prussian concentration nullified this advantage. By the time the Austrians were fully assembled, they would be unable to concentrate against one Prussian army without having the other two instantly attack their flank and rear, threatening their lines of communication.

As early as 19 June Moltke had been suggesting that Falckenstein should use the railway system to move troops around to Eisenach by sending them east to Magdeburg, south from there to join the rail line that ran west to Gotha and then Eisenach. Moltke did have some troops around Gotha and Eisenach, but nowhere near enough to stop a determined Hanoverian attack.

On the morning of 22 June Falckenstein ordered the 13th Division and Manteuffel to concentrate around Göttingen, ready to move to Cassel and then Frankfurt. Beyer was ordered to concentrate around Ottmannshausen, west of the Hanoverian position, and send scouts out towards Eisenach. He ignored orders from Moltke to send troops on a railway that ran from Göttingen to Cassel then curved around east to Eisenach, using the destruction of a rail tunnel as his excuse.

Later, during a gap in the fighting the Prussians rushed reinforcements to Eisenach. During the night of 24-25 June five battalions from Beyer's corps arrived on foot, and another five from the 13th Division arrived by rail. Falckenstein was also forced to move troops to Gotha, detaching five battalions from Manteuffel's division. These troops arrived late on 25 June. Negotiations on 25 June went fairly badly, but they did produce a truce, believed by the Prussians to be for 24 hours and by the Hanoverians to be 'until further notice'. This caused a muddle on 26 June, not helped by Moltke's attempts to manage the campaign from Berlin using incomplete information. In particular he believed that the Hanoverians were retreating north after a foraging party discovered on the night of 26-27 June was misreported as a major troop concentration. Falckenstein continued to disobey orders to concentrate against the Hanoverians. On 27 June he issued orders to Mantauffel to operate against the Hanoverians, while his other two divisions were faced south to deal with a possible Bavarian attack (based on false reports).

On 14 July the advancing Prussians defeated the Austrians and Hessians at Aschaffenburg. Alexander was forced to use a route further west, and began to send his remaining troops along the railway through Darmstadt. However the Prussians weren't in a position to prevent this movement, as only Goeben's Division was on the Main - the other two divisions were still thirty miles to the east. Goeben's men were too tired to pursue the retreating Federal troops.

The Advance to the Danube

The last phase of the campaign was shaped by the limited Austrian railway system. A single line ran north-east from Vienna then turned north to run toward Moravia. In Moravia it split into two, with the eastern branch heading to Olmütz, where the Austrians had originally concentrated their army and the western branch running through Brünn. The two branches reunited close to the border between Moravia and Bohemia and ran west towards Prague. About half way to Prague another line branched off to the north, heading to Josephstadt. This line had been used during the Austrian advance.

To the east of all of these railways were the Carpathian Mountains, with Hungary to their east. At the southern end of the mountains is Pressburg, on the north bank of the Danube. A railway ran from Hungary to Pressburg and then west towards Vienna, joining up with the Olmütz line half way between the two cities.

Benedek had two choices as he retreated from Königgrätz. He could head for Vienna, using roads and the railway to Brünn or he could move further east, to Olmütz, where there was a powerful fortress and an entrenched camp. The first option would have protected Vienna, but ran the risk of the army falling apart on the march. The other offered more hope of keeping the army fairly intact, but left Vienna fairly open to a Prussian attack. However Benedek knew that fresh Austrian troops were on their way from Italy, the Danube was a significant barrier, and Vienna wasn’t undefended. Moreover an intact Austrian army at Olmütz would have threatened the left flank of any Prussian attack on Vienna. As a result he decided to make for Olmütz with most of his army. Part of the cavalry was ordered south to slow down any Prussian advance towards Vienna, and the 10th Corps was ordered to move directly to Vienna by railway. By 11 July Benedek's army was concentrated at Olmütz once again.

Moltke's main task in the aftermath of the battle was to find the Austrians and keep up the pressure on them. He ordered the Army of the Elbe to move south towards Iglau (now Jihlava), on the road from Prague to Brünn. The First Army was to move south to Prelouc, where the Elbe flowed west on its way towards Prague. On the Prussian left the Second Army was to make for Pardubitz, at the bend in the Elbe, and then continue south to Chrudim. As a result the Prussians were moving along a more westerly line than the Austrians.

The Prussians reached the Elbe south of the battlefield late on 5 July. They then back to move towards Brünn and by 11 July were with one day's march of that city. Benedek realised that he could no longer hold on at Olmütz, and he ordered most of his army to move along the railway towards Vienna. One corps would remain to defend Olmütz. The 3rd Corps was first to move, and was on its way by the evening of 11 July. Benedek also realized that the railway might soon be cut, and so prepared an alternative route down the valley of the River March, which ran west of the Carpathians and reached the Danube around Pressburg.

Once again the Prussians moved too quickly for the Austrians. On 13 July he ordered the Army of the Elbe to move south towards Znaim, a route that would eventually bring it to the Danube west of Vienna. The First Army was allowed to rest at Brünn. The Second Army was ordered to move east and block the railway line somewhere south of Olmütz.

Moltke's plans changed when his scouts reported that the Austrians were moving south-east from Olmütz towards Prerau. Early on 15 July Moltke halted the Army of the Elbe and First Army's moves towards Vienna, and ordered them instead to prepare to the possibility of another battle south of Olmütz. The Second Army continued to advance south-east to try and cut off the Austrian retreat.

The Austro-Prussian War ended quickly and was fought mainly with existing weapons and munitions. Railroads were used solely for troop transport. No known photographs exist.